Negative databases -negative representations of a set of data -have been introduced in 2004 to protect the data they contain. Up to this day, there was no known solution to constitute biometric negative databases. This is surprising as biometric applications are very needy of such protection for privacy reasons. The main difficulty comes from the fact that biometric captures of the same trait give different results and comparisons of the stored reference with the fresh captured biometric data has to take into account this variability. In this paper, we give a first answer to this problem by exhibiting a way to create and exploit biometric negative databases.
INTRODUCTION
Biometric data must be protected in order to prevent someone to be able to track back the users of a biometric system. Recently, there have been a lot of studies on the biometric storage in a way which is renewable and does not leak information. Typically, biometric data are quantized and encrypted. This encryption must still permit the matching of the underlying biometric data without decrypting them. On one hand, some very simple techniques of encryption, known as secure sketches have been suggested [10, 19] but their resistance seems doubtful in practice [2, 20] . On the Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. other hand, secure sketches can be combined with homomorphic encryption but in this case, the performances of the computations are penalized [1, 5, 21] .
In this paper, we have a different approach following the one of the negative databases [12] . In a negative database, instead of having the elements of a database DB, we consider the complementary DB of these elements. This means that instead of checking whether b ∈ DB, we have to equivalently verify that b / ∈ DB. The representation of negative databases is made possible thanks to a wild-card symbol * which stands for all the values; for instance, as we are here going to work with binary vectors, a * for a bit means either the value 0 or 1. Negative databases have very interesting properties. Firstly, for a given database DB, different negative databases DB can be established. Moreover, starting from DB, it is hard to retrieve DB. Finally, relational algebra also exists for negative databases. It should be noted that our approach is different from the previous one which treats biometric data individually while we are here considering a database as a whole.
The difficulty we encounter is that each capture of the same biometric data gives a different value. We here consider binarized biometric data, i.e. b stands for a binary vector representing a biometric trait. A new capture of this biometric trait will give a binary vector with numerous coordinates differing from the ones of b. Our approach follows the one described in [16] for identifying people thanks to their iris. We here how show to handle this problem.
We begin in Section 2 by recalling some works on the binarization of biometric data. We state the properties these binarized data have to fulfill for the rest of our work. In Section 3, we give a short introduction to negative databases. Section 4 constitutes the core of our proposal and explains how to create and use biometric negative databases. We give an example to gauge the efficiency of our solution when applied to a real-life case. Section 6 concludes. In Appendix A, we describe the application of our idea to another negative database construction relying on standard cryptographic assumptions.
We conclude this introduction by recalling some basic facts about biometric data. A reader, familiar with this topic, can skip it to go directly to Section 2.
Biometric Systems: 101
Biometric recognition techniques can lead to quite different applications than those which are possible when you are dealing with, for instance, passwords. A major difference comes from the fact that your biometric data enable to identify yourself among a large set of people during your whole lifetime. This characteristic is reinforced by the fact that biometric data are non-transferable to someone else. On one hand, a positive aspect is that this can been seen as a very natural and easy-to-deploy way of identifying populations (think at the census of the citizens of a country). On the other hand, biometric data must be protected to respect their owner's privacy. Today, AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) are present in many countries for police or civil applications. These AFIS can gather together the biometric data of millions of users. Usually, for measuring their performances, we evaluate their accuracy in terms of FRR (False Reject Rate: the probability that the system rejects a genuine user) and FAR (False Acceptance Rate: the probability that the system accepts an impostor). These 2 rates FAR and FRR cannot be reduced both at the same time and some compromise must be found depending on our wish to favour security or comfort. In this paper, we are looking at biometric systems of smaller scale. Typically, we are considering biometric readers mainly used for restricting the access control to a building or a room. The need for storage of biometric data is then limited to less than one hundred records.
BINARIZATION OF BIOMETRIC DATA
Let β designate the biometric trait of an user. Let b ← β indicate that the value b has been captured by a sensor.
We here make the hypothesis that the biometric b are quantized and can be presented as binary vectors of length n, b ∈ {0, 1} n in such a way that: The origin of Condition 1 comes from iris recognition technology [8] where the concept of iriscodes was introduced. Iriscodes are binary vectors of length n = 2048 where the features of iris are represented. They are compared by their Hamming distance. Various attempts were made in order to apply this kind of representations to fingerprints [3, 18] or faces as in [6] .
Condition 1 has been exploited in [16] for an efficient search algorithm over a large database. With a high probability the vectors we are comparing will have many small portions of their coordinates equal whenever they come from the same user as they are close for the Hamming distance. Let DB = {b 1, . . . , bN }. [16] uses h1, . . . , h128, projections of binary vectors (here iriscodes) over a part of their coordinates. They consider that a freshly captured iris b can match an element stored in DB whenever:
for 1 ≤ j 1 < j2 < j3 ≤ 128 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n. We here skip the details. This way of proceeding will serve us as the basis of our work on biometric negative databases which is described in Section 4. We recall a definition that formalizes this notion and which has been introduced for approximate nearest neighbor search: Definition 1 (Locality-Sensitive Hashing, [17] 
In the sequel we will assume that the inequalities above are equalities, i.e. the first (resp. second) probability is equal to p 1 (resp. p2). This holds for the hash constructions used by [16] .
In practice, we apply Condition 1 to a family of LocalitySensitive Hashing functions that are combined to obtain the following result: 
and the probability to output 'matching' for an impostorcalled False Accept Rate (FAR) -is approximately
The variable m is called order of the hash equalities in the sequel.
Proof. Let b 1, b2 be two different biometric captures (possibly coming from the same user). They are considered as a matching pair as soon there is at least m functions
As H is (λmin, λmax, p1, p2)-LSH, from Condition 1, we know that with a high probability P r h∈H [h(b1) = h(b2)] = p 1 if b1, b2 come from the same user and P r h∈H [h(b1) = h(b 2)] = p2 if they come from different users.
In the formula above, we remark that p2 needs to be very small to ensure a small value for the probability P fa (i.e. a small FAR).
NEGATIVE DATABASES
A negative database consists of the representation of the negative image of a given database. The goal is to represent all the elements not in the original database instead of storing explicitly the data itself. The main issue is to find a way to represent concisely the negative database without letting the possibility to retrieve easily the original records. Note that there exists an extended notion of negative database where almost all elements not in the original database are represented. In this section, we refer only to the first notion for which the definition -inspired by by Esponda et al. [12] and subsequent works -follows.
Definition 2. Let DB be a database containing N vectors. Let l denote the length of the binary vectors belonging to DB. A negative database DB of DB is a finite set of vectors such that
• there is an algorithm IsMember DB enabling to check efficiently whether one l bits string is a member of DB;
If l is large, then the number of elements represented by DB could be huge. To achieve a compact representation, [14] introduced the wild-card symbol ' * ', with the classical role: a position set to * in a string represents both 0 and 1 values. This doing a negative database is composed of vectors of length l with the alphabet {0, 1, * }. The associated IsMember DB algorithm corresponds to the string matching algorithm; a element x is a member if DB contains a vector y for which simultaneous binary-valued positions of x and y should be equal:
Several polynomial-time algorithms have been published for negative databases computation [7, 9, 13] with quite different techniques. We recall in Table 1 the algorithm introduced in [12] to compute a negative representation of a database thanks to the prefix method. w i will stand in the following to a prefix of length i and W i will represent the set of vectors of length i (a part of the w i's).
W (i+1) ← set of vectors of length i+1 with a prefix of length i in W i which is not a prefix of an element of DB
4.
for all x in W i+1 5 . output a vector y with x as a prefix and complete it with * 's up to length l 6. add to DB
. go back to step 3 while i < l Table 1 : Prefix algorithm for negative representation
As proved in [14] , the prefix algorithm outputs a negative database in lN time (where N is the number of records of DB) and the resulting negative database will have at most lN entries (elements of {0, 1, * } l ). This leads for DB to an overall size (2 × N × l 2 ). The prefix algorithm shows the feasibility of negative representation. As for security concerns, [14] demonstrated that the reconstruction of DB from such a negative database with alphabet {0, 1, * } is NP-hard, based on reduction to 3-SAT problem. Concerning the way to construct hard instances which resist to SAT solvers, the known algorithms produce negative representations with different level of security, depending for example on the number of * 's used. See [9, 13] for solutions to generate such hard instances. Another interesting property is the capability to create several different randomized negative representations from the same DB.
To obtain a randomized representation, [13] suggests a non deterministic version of the prefix algorithm based on:
• the use of random permutation to include the wildcard symbol also at the beginning or in the middle of a vector;
• a random replacement of wild-card by both the values 0 and 1.
The resulting algorithm is designed to run in time l 2 N 2 and produces negative databases of size 2 × N × l 3 . From a given negative database, it is even possible to transform it into a new negative representation which is the negative image of the same database, but for which the two negative databases are different and it is difficult to determine if they are equivalent. In [11] , this operation is denoted Morph.
Together with the creation of a negative representation, specific operations on DB are translated in operations applied on DB. Inserting (resp. deleting) a string into (resp. from) DB corresponds to remove (resp. insert) the corresponding binary strings from (resp. into) DB. As for the creation algorithm, randomized operations are also available [12] . Thus for creating a randomized representation, an alternative solution is to start with a randomized negative representation of the empty set and to delete the data corresponding to DB.
As remarked by [13] , using these operations many times may have the effect on the size of DB to grow unreasonably. An algorithm, to clean regularly the representation, is designed to control this bad effect (cf. Clean-Up algorithm [13] ).
Moreover, more complex operations are designed in [15] in the field of relational algebra operators (equality, less-than, union, cartesian product, intersection, . . .). Each operator on DB has its transposition as an negative operator on DB.
Note that several other techniques are analyzed in the literature. For instance [7] introduced a construction with similar properties for which the security relies on classical cryptographic properties. In Appendix A, we describe this construction and the application of our idea.
OUR SOLUTION
We now explain how to manage biometric data via negative representation in order to protect the content of the enrollment database. The main motivation is an authorization scenario, nonetheless our construction can also be used for authentication. Authorization is the situation where one proves that he is member of a given authorization list. Authentication corresponds to the case where one proves that he corresponds to the identity he claimed.
Biometric Negative Database
We recall that our database DB contains the templates b 1, . . . , bN . Let H = {h1, . . . , hL} be a (λmin, λmax, p1, p2)-LSH family of functions (cf. Definition 1). Let m be the order of the hash equalities, i.e. the number of these functions we are using as in Prop. 1. We are now ready to define the biometric negative database DB.
For 1 ≤ k ≤ N , let DB b k be the database made of the elements
with 1 ≤ j1 < . . . < jm ≤ L and where || stands for the concatenation. (2)).
The algorithm to determine if one fresh capture b is close to one enrolled template within the original dataset DB via one of its biometric negative database DB is explained in Table 2 .
Input: fresh biometric template b This construction enables us to achieve the following properties.
Proposition 2. Let DB be an (H, m, DB)-biometric negative database, then:
1. DB is not a negative database of DB.
DB enables to check whether a fresh capture b is close to one element of DB by verifying whether all the derived hash chains following Eq. (2) are not in DB.

The error rates of this membership checking operation are:
False 'Not Member' Decision
False 'Member' Decision
Proof.
1. The first statement comes from the fact that DB is a negative database of U = S N k=1 DB b k , which is not equivalent to DB, thanks to Proposition 1 (except in the case where p 1, p2 are negligible, which corresponds to the situation where the hash functions are cryptographic ones with hard-to-find collisions; i.e. the case where almost only original data satisfy the order m hash equalities).
2. The second statement is induced together by Proposition 1 and Definition 2. The algorithm IsMember DB gives a way to decide whether data are in U from the negative test of presence in DB. Moreover, Proposition 1 implies that for a genuine user, the probability not to find an order m hash chain following Eq. (2) in U is approximately
(i.e. that you find neither any genuine equality nor any impostor equality). Similarly, the probability for an impostor to find an order m hash chain following Eq. (2) in U is
When using the prefix algorithm described in Table 1 , or its randomized variant, the overall size of a biometric negative database is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The size of an (H, m, DB)-biometric negative database DB obtained through the prefix algorithm is at most
2 × N × L m ! × l 2
where l is the length of the binary representation of an order m hash chain as in Eq. (2). Via its randomized variant, the upper size becomes
Proof. DB is a negative database of U = S N k=1 DB b k . Each DB b k contains all order m hash chains obtained for the template b k , i.e. all the m choices of hash functions among the L from H. The remaining is deduced from the expansion when the algorithms for negative representation of Section 3 are applied.
When the original database DB contains N templates of length n, in the deterministic case, the expansion factor is
in the randomized case. Note that although we focus here on the expansion when applying the prefix algorithms, our concept is compatible with any algorithm for negative representation generation.
Security Discussion
Concerning the confidentiality of the original templates, the choice of an adequate negative database creation algorithm leads to:
an (H, m, DB)-biometric negative database generated through an algorithm which outputs hard instances of the reconstruction problem (cf. Section 3). The knowledge of DB does not allow to retrieve the list of original templates in DB.
This is straightforward, because with the above assumption, reconstructing U is hard. Note that even without that reconstructing the original templates might be a difficult task: if one succeeds in retrieving part of the hash chains of U from DB, he still has no idea of which hash chains are related to the same original template. Nevertheless, one additional advantage of using hard instances, as already mentioned in Section 3, is the possibility to create several, and unlinkable, randomized representations. This means that it is possible to obtain different biometric negative databases from the same authorization list. For instance this fits well to access control use cases where the local terminals can possess the same authorization list, without -thanks to our technique -letting the possibility to make a direct correlation between them.
Other advantages are implied by these negative representations and their randomization. It hides the number of data which are negatively represented and after insertion or deletion of data, applying randomization on a negative database enables to hide the size variation of the original dataset.
Operations
On biometric negative databases as defined in Definition 3, we can apply all the operations available for classical negative databases -see Section 3 -such as the randomization, insertion, deletion, clean-up, relational algebra, . . ., operations. Nevertheless all operations on DB have not the same impact with respect to the original database DB.
In particular, we are interested in the two following operations.
Enrollment of a new user, via a new capture b N +1, is straightforward using the insertion functionality of the negative database for all the hash chains computed from b N +1.
Revocation of a user is less easy. Due to the property of the biometric negative database structure, only authorization checks are possible and there is no way to link different hash chains together. So when using deletion functionality of negative databases, with respect to a fresh capture b which is prior determined as authorized (i.e. close to a b k for some k), you can only delete the hash chains found for b (i.e. to add in DB the hash chains computed from b ). Thus this will not suppress all the hash chains related to b k . Moreover, if the prior authorization corresponds to a False 'Member' Decision, then this revocation would affect other users. This last point is a common problem for anonymous membership checks in biometric systems. Concerning the former issue, we suggest to mitigate it by avoiding deletion of database through DB but by adding a dedicated revocation database (blacklist), which can be represented in a negative form.
Variant for Authentication
The Definition 3 leads to the construction of a biometric negative database for authorization checks purpose. When authentication (1-to-1) is aimed, the variant below is given. 
Appending k enables to restrict the verification to one sole DB b k . The associated algorithm for authentication check, with a fresh capture b and an identity claim i, is described in Table 3 . Note that this construction can be used as well for identification use cases where no identity claim is provided by running comparisons with all elements of DB auth : the list of possible identities would be the list of index k for which b is not detected as member of DB b k .
Input: fresh biometric template b and identity claim i • The False Reject Rate of the authentication check (Table 3) is P fr .
• The False Accept Rate of the authentication check (Table 3) is P fa .
• When using the randomized variant of the prefix algorithm, the size of DB auth is
Note that here, we give only the size with respect to the randomized variant of the prefix algorithm. We cannot use the deterministic variant as there is no mixing of the different datasets DB k that would ensure unlinkability of the hash chains.
Remark 1. It is interesting that the expansion factor in the authorization scenario is lower or equal to the expansion factor in the authentication scenario.
AN EXAMPLE
We describe now the application of our concept to the example of functions used in [16] for iris identification. The functions used by [16] If we choose a hash chain order m equal to 4, then the binary length of the hash chains is l = (7 + 10) × 4 = 68 and the error rates are P fr 0.066 and P fa 0.095. This shows the interest of using hash chains. This choice of parameteres is valuable for authentication use case. This needs still to be improved to be efficient for authorization use case with medium scale databases.
According to Lemma 1, the upper bound for expansion factors when using the deterministic prefix algorithm will be about 2 25.5 and about 2 31.6 with the randomized prefix algorithm.
As an even more practical example, if we take the order m equal to 3 -which is the threshold used in [16] for determination of candidates in an iris identification scenarioand N = 100 enrolled iriscodes from different users, then it leads to an overall biometric negative database of about 20 GB.
CONCLUSION
This paper introduces the notion of negative database for biometric data. While the concept of negative database has been introduced in 2004, our proposal is the first one, as far as we know on this very subject. Although the storage of biometric data seems a natural field of application for this concept of negative database, one should understand that what make our work possible are the prior researches on the quantization of biometric. Indeed, our contribution exploits the simpler matching algorithm that this quantization permits. This is not the first time that these new matching algorithms raise results. For instance, beyond their own interest as an alternative to traditional matching algorithms, they are currently considered as a part of the solution for biometric identification in a encrypted way [4] .
We believe that our scheme can still be optimized. For example, we directly store in the positive database DB the biometric data taken during the enrollment phase. Whereas, we are interested in the whole Hamming ball of radius λ min. A clever representation of biometric data should lead to more compact positive database and negative database. We here describe the principles of the construction [7] which relies on standard cryptographic assumptions. Two constructions are given, one based on cryptographic hash functions and the other based on Discrete Logarithm problem.
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Let DB be a database containing N elements from a universe M (for instance {0, 1} l ). The basic principle is to use a one-way function H : R × M → T that maps a pair of value (r, x) for r ∈ R a random element and x ∈ DB to a value t ∈ T . The transformed g DB of DB -as introduced by [7] -is then defined as the set of all pairs (r x, H(rx, x) ) for x ∈ DB and r x chosen randomly (one rx for each element x of DB). Then the size of the original database can be obfuscated by adding dummy pairs (r , t ) with r ∈ R, t ∈ T chosen at random. Checking if an element y is in DB is done by testing for all elements (r, t) in DB whether t = H(r, y) and if an equality is found, y is declared as a member of DB (here membership checking is not a negative one).
Although the construction is not formally a negation of the original properties, nevertheless it achieves most of expected properties:
• g DB is hard to reverse thanks to the use of a one-way function (no algorithm more efficient than exhaustive search to recover DB).
• the construction does not introduce false positive: IsMember g DB outputs a positive decision only for DB elements (except with a negligible probability).
• g DB is easy to update.
• The size of the positive image DB is obfuscated.
• The representation is naturally probabilistic, so that it is hard to correlate two different negative databases.
Moreover, the size of g DB is linear in the size of DB: so, the overhead due to the transformation is lower than with Esponda et al. [12] 's technique. However, note that one interesting advantage of the prefix algorithm is to ensure a string based representation which enables partial string matching in order to speed up a query and which also permits specific relational algebra operations (cf. [15] ).
Two examples of one-way function are given in [7] :
• H(r, x) can be computed as h(r||x) (where || denotes the concatenation) with a cryptographic hash function h, such as SHA-256 (as part of the hash input is known, h needs at least to ensure the property of partial preimage resistance).
• H can be an exponentiation to rely on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm problem: in [7] , H is defined as H(g r , m) = g rm . In that case, additional properties are possible (see discussion on zero-knowledge proofs in [7] ).
A.2 Biometric Transformed Databases
To apply the above cryptographic transformed database construction to biometrics, we proceed as in Section 4.
From 
In an identification scenario, we may scramble the entries of g DB to avoid the possibility for an user to infer who is registered close to him. An authentication variant is possible: no scrambling is applied and you provide to the user the index in g DB of the entries associated to his enrolled data. To this aim, the database can be organized by rows with hash chains associated to the same biometric template in the same row, and the identifier of the user is the index of the corresponding row. 
